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Abstract
This paper studies the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a local inter-
action setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies
that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The strategy is
embedded in an explicitly defined expectation system, which is a more
compact way than machines to describe strategies in the local interaction
setup, although essentially the expectation system can also be viewed as
a finite state automaton. The belief system is derived by perturbing the
strategy appropriately and following the principle that parsimonious ex-
planations receive all the weight. The equilibrium has the property that
after any global history, full cooperation will be restored after a finite
number of periods.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers a society where individuals interact with others locally, but
a social norm of cooperative behavior is nonetheless sought to be sustained in
society as a whole. The development and stability of social norms of cooperation
is usually studied through an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, and we
adopt the same approach in this paper.
An example might clarify the nature of the problem. Consider a typical road
in residential suburban America where each house has a lawn in front. Each
houseowner derives a utility v from a well maintained lawn, but can only see
her own lawn and those of her neighbors. The cost c of maintaining one’s lawn
is strictly greater than v. In the case each homeowner has two neighbors, her
payoff, if both neighbors maintain their lawns and she does not, is 2v, while if
she does is 3v − c. If neither neighbor maintains his lawn, her payoff is v − c if
she does and 0 otherwise.
Would we expect to see the lawns well maintained along the road in the
absence of police enforcement of regulations? This paper argues that this is
possible in pure strategies. In general, we want to model a situation in which
local interaction does not create an intrinsic barrier to global cooperation.
1.1 The model
The model has the following features:
1. A straight line with finitely many integer points.
2. On each integer point lives an agent. Each agent has two neighbors
except the end agents, who have only one neighbor.1 Let N (j) denote j’s
neighborhood.
3. Time is discrete, t = 1, 2, ...,∞.
4. The stage game is the prisoner’s dilemma.
C D
C 1, 1 −l, 1 + g
D 1 + g,−l 0, 0
where g > 0, l > 0.
1For ease of exposition, we assume that the reference player (player j) has two neighbors.
None of the results in the paper depends on this assumption.
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5. In each period, each player plays the stage game with his two neighbors.
He plays the same action against the two neighbors, and his stage game payoff
is the sum of his payoffs against both neighbors.
6. Everybody has the same discount factor δ.
7. Each agent only observes what happens in his own neighborhood.
8. Let htj denote player j’s private history: h
t
j =
(
asj−1, a
s
j , a
s
j+1
)t−1
s=1
,
where ask ∈ {C, D} , k ∈ N (j). Let Hj denote the set of j’s private histories.
A pure strategy of player j is a mapping from Hj to {C, D}.
We are looking for a sequential equilibrium2 that supports cooperation on
the line. The first natural candidate is, of course, the trigger strategy.3 A trigger
strategy plays cooperation after any history in which no one in the neighborhood
has ever defected, and defection otherwise. It turns out that when l ≥ 1, the
trigger strategy works if δ ≥ g1+g . When l < 1, the trigger strategy also works
if δ ∈
[
g
1+g ,
g+l
1+g
]
.
The trigger strategy fails when l < 1 and δ is large enough for a simple
reason. When the cost of being defected upon is smaller than the payoff to
mutual cooperation, and when people are sufficiently patient, they have an
incentive to block the spread of defection. That is, people would rather live
between a good neighbor and a bad one, than to punish the bad neighbor and
then live between two bad neighbors forever. The problem with the trigger
strategy is that punishment is both too severe and too lenient. It is too severe
in that even the slightest mistake will never be forgiven; it is too lenient in that
further deviation (like blocking) is not further punished.
There is a quick fix to the trigger strategy when l < 1 and δ is too large. We
know that the trigger strategy still works for δ ∈
[
g
1+g ,
g+l
1+g
]
. By [3, Lemma
2], for any sufficiently large δ, we can always use trigger strategy to support
cooperation by diluting the original game into a certain number of replica games.
Players play the trigger strategy in each replica, and when they play in some
replica, they ignore observations from other replicas. Effectively dilution reduces
players’ discount factor so that it falls back into the interval
[
g
1+g ,
g+l
1+g
]
. The
problems with dilution are that (a) The diluted strategy is not uniform with
respect to δ: the larger δ is, the more replicas are needed to make people less
patient; (b) The equilibrium is not "globally stable" in the sense that after some
histories, full cooperation will never be restored.
2The standard notion of sequential equilibrium is defined for finite extensive form games.
We have an extension of it in the next section.
3The discussion on trigger strategy and mixed strategy below is derived in a working paper
by V. Bhaskar.
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An alternative to resolving the problem is using a mixed strategy. The idea
is to create some uncertainty about whether one’s neighbor is going to punish
or block defection, in such a way that this player himself is indifferent between
punishing and blocking. The nice feature of the mixed strategy equilibrium is
that bad behavior can be localized so that most part of the society is left unaf-
fected even if some player always plays defection. A mixed strategy equilibrium
of this form exists when the line is infinite in both directions. With a finite
number of agents, there is an "endpoint" problem, to be explained in the next
subsection.
The main result of this paper is the following. In the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma on the finite line, for any l < 1, g > 0, there is a sequential equilib-
rium in pure strategies that supports cooperation for any sufficiently large δ.
Moreover, the equilibrium has the property that after any global history, full
cooperation will be restored after a finite number of periods. As in standard
folk theorem type of strategies (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986), we need a book
keeping device to keep track of punishments and rewards as the game goes on.
In standard theory this is done by a machine, but here a machine is a very incon-
venient way to describe strategies, due to the fact that different players observe
different things in the game. Instead of writing down a machine explicitly, we
define a pair of expectation operators recursively,
(
Ej
(
·|htj
)
, Ej
(
Ek (·) |h
t
j
))
.
For any private history htj , Ej
(
·|htj
)
is the expectation that j forms on the fu-
ture path of play in his neighborhood, Ej
(
Ek (·) |h
t
j
)
is the expectation that j
forms on his neighbor k’s expectation on j’s future actions. After htj , j simply
does what Ej
(
·|htj
)
expects him to do. As we will see in the paper, the device
of expectations keep track of things more efficiently than a machine. It also
has the added advantage that when we go to sequential equilibrium, we can use
these expectations as an intermediate step to prove sequential rationality.
1.2 An example
Let us illustrate the strategy by the following three player expample.
• −−−−− • −−−−− •
1 2 3
Initially everybody expects everybody to play cooperation forever. Then if
say player 2 is surprised by a defection from player 1, 2 expects himself to begin
a punishment of, say T periods, and then to go back to cooperation forever.
2 expects 1 to play anything (i.e. neither D nor C will surprise him again)
in the next T − 1 periods, then 2 expects 1 to go back to C (the ambiguity
in 2’s expectation is not necessary here, since 2 knows that if 1 follows the
strategy, 1 will have T − 1 periods of D to play for sure. The ambiguity will be
useful after more complicated histories, so that when someone finishes punishing
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one neighbor, he can safely go back to C without further surprising the other
neighbor). Player 2 also expects that 1 expects 2 to punish for T periods, and
if 2 fails to punish, 2 will surprise 1 and trigger a more severe punishment.
At the same time, 2 anticipates that the punishment will surprise 3 in turn,
so he expects 3 to punish him for T periods. If 3 fails to fully carry out the
punishment, then 2 expects himself to punish 3 for a much longer period of time,
say bT periods, b > 1. Meanwhile, it is the mutual expectation of 2 and 3 that 3
should keep playing cooperation after 3 blocks. Finally 2 should also anticipate
that his long punishment will keep surprising 1 from time to time later on, and
1 should react to it appropriately, and so on. A kind of social norm can thus be
established by specifying people’s expectations after any history. People then
use the expectations to judge other people’s behavior, and to guide their own.
Given any history of player 2, if he expects himself to play C in the next
period, the strategy is going to be defined such that he also expects that at
least one of the neighbors also expects him to play C, and if he deviates, he
will postpone the time when the entire neighborhood goes back to C; if he
expects himself to play D in the next period, he does not want to play C
because it is either unnecessary to do so (when both 2 and 3 expect anything
from him), or too costly to do so (when he expects at least one neighbor to
expect him to play D). So far, sequential rationality is relative to the artificially
defined expectation operators. Sequential equilibrium requires that the strategy
be optimal with respect to real expectations formed under a consistent belief
system. As we will see in later sections, essentially these real expectations are
going to be duplicated by the artificial expectations, if we perturb the strategy
approriately.
We can also see from this example why the mixed strategy does not work
for a finite number of players: 2 has incentive to mix between punishing and
blocking only if 1 and 3 also have such incentive, but they do not.
1.3 Related Literature
The literature that initially studies the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with local
interaction takes an evolutionary approach (Bergstrom and Stark 1993; Eshel et
al. 1998; Nowark and May 1993). The main idea of this literature is that local
interaction, combined with simple imitation rules, helps maintain cooperation
because if cooperators are grouped together, the benefits of cooperation are
enjoyed mainly among cooperators, who then earn relatively high payoffs and
are imitated. The reason that local interaction might help sustain cooperation
no longer applies when the players are fully rational, which is the case in this
paper. Nonetheless, we show that global cooperation is still possible to achieve,
provided that the players are sufficiently patient.
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This paper can also be viewed as a special variation under a general theme,
which is to disperse information in a repeated game among the players and
ask whether the efficient outcome can still be maintained or not. There are
other ways to disperse information (Bhaskar 1998; Kandori 1992). In Kandori
(1992), people are pairwise matched at random in each period and play the
prisoner’s dilemma in each match. Each player only observes what goes on
in his own matches, but not in other matches. Kandori (1992) constructs a
contagion strategy that supports the cooperative outcome, provided that the
cost of being defected upon is sufficiently large.4 Bhaskar (1998) studies a
simple transfer game in an overlapping generation setup, and finds that with
some mild informational constraints, transfers (from the young to the old in
each period) cannot be supported by pure strategy equilibria. For example, if
each generation only observes the actions of the past generation, then the only
pure strategy equilibrium is global autarchy.
Apart from the superficial differences between our model and the random
matching model, there are similarities as well as differences between the two. In
both models, if l is large enough, the trigger strategy works for sufficiently large
δ;5 if l is small, the trigger strategy works for moderate values of δ. Moreover,
Ellison’s dilution idea applies to both models. The differences are more subtle:
in the random matching model with public randomization, the supporting strat-
egy is uniform with respect to δ, so long as δ is large enough. Without public
randomization, however, the supporting strategy is not uniform with respect to
δ. In addition, the equilibrium with public randomization is globally stable,6
but without public randomization, it is unknown whether global stability is pos-
sible. In our model, the strategy, call it E from now on, is both uniform with
respect to δ and globally stable, for any l < 1 and g > 0.
In the anonymous random matching model, a player’s information about
history can be summarized by a one dimensional statistic. It is impossible to
keep track of other players’ actions, and it is not necessary either. Although a
player needs to guess how many players have been infected after any history,
Kandori and Ellison simplified the analysis by constructing a strategy that is
optimal against any reasonable guesses. Hence consistency is not an issue. In
our model, however, the information is two dimensional, and a player has to
treat them separately. Instead of implementing a T -period punishment scheme
probablistically, as in the strategy with public randomization in the random
matching model, we carry it out deterministically here. The tradeoff is we have
to specify a consistent belief system, because the strategy cannot be a best
response for all belief systems.
4Ellison (1994) embeds a public randomizing device into the contagion strategy and showed
that cooperation can be supported for any payoff parameters.
5 In the random matching model the cutoff value of l depends on the population size, but
it does not here.
6 In the sense of Kandori (1992), global stability requires that players be able to return to
efficient outcome eventually after any history.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the pure strategy E,
by defining a pair of expectation operators inductively. Section 3 shows that
the strategy is sequentially rational with respect to the expectation operators.
Section 4 derives a consistent belief system, under which real expectations can
be formed after any private history. It is then shown that the real expectations
formed after a history can be mimiced by the expectation operators after the
same history. Section 5 concludes.
2 The strategy E
2.1 The solution concept
The solution concept we use is sequential equilibrium. Extending the notion
of sequential equilibrium from finite extensive form games to infinite extensive
form games requires no conceptual innovation, but it involves some technical
difficulty. However, when the only infinite object is the number of informa-
tion sets, and the number of information sets is countably many, then there is
a natural extension of sequential equilibrium, which we give in the following
definitions.
Definition Given an assessment (σ, µ), µ is consistent with respect to σ
if there exists a sequence of completely mixed behavior strategy profiles σ (n),
such that
(i)σ (n) converges to σ pointwise,
(ii)µ (n) converges to µ pointwise.
where µ (n) is the belief system derived from σ (n) using Bayes’ rule.
Definition An assessment (σ,µ) is a sequential equilibrium if (i) σ is
sequentially rational with respect to µ, and (ii) µ is consistent with respect to
σ.
In practice, given σ, it is convenient to construct a consistent belief system
µ in the following way. First let us define a mistake pattern M . Fix  > 0,
perturb σ such that for any player j, for any information set hj of j, for any
action aj of j at hj , M assigns a polynomial of  (could be a constant) to aj
as the probability that j will play aj at hj . The perturbations are independent
across information sets, and for any a′j ∈ hj , M
(
a′j
)
> 0,
∑
a′
j
∈hj
M
(
a′j
)
= 1,
for any hj , for any j.
Under a mistake pattern M , there is a perturbed strategy profile σ (). We
require that there exists (n)n, such that n −→ 0 as n −→∞, and σ (n) −→ σ
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pointwise as n goes to infinity. Now fix an information set hj . Since there
is a one to one correspondence between the nodes in hj and the histories that
lead to those nodes, it suffices to form a belief vector over the histories. A
history will also be called an explanation since it explains why the information
set is reached. Fix a history ht that leads to hj , compute the probability
of ht according to σ (). The significant part is the smallest power of  and
the corresponding coefficient. Denote that power by pi (ht). Define H
(
htj
)
=
argmin{pi (ht) |ht explains hj}. Only members in H
(
htj
)
survive as  −→ 0.
We say H
(
htj
)
is the collection of parsimonious explanations. Now allocate
the whole probability mass among members in H
(
htj
)
in proportion to their
coefficients. This is the belief vector over hj . Clearly a belief system formed in
this way is consistent with respect to σ.
2.2 Notations and Definitions
Before we define E, we introduce the following notations and definitions:
Notations
1. j’s expectation on N (j)’s continuation actions after htj :((
Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t
,
where Ej
(
asj |h
t
j
)
∈ {C, D}, and Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
∈ {C, D, D/C}, for any k ∈
N (j) \ {j} . When j expects D/C from k, it means that j expects anything
from k, i.e. neither D nor C will contradict j’s expectation, hence surprise j.
2. j’s expectation on k’s expectation on j’s continuation actions after htj ,
k ∈ N (j) \ {j}: ((
Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
))
k∈N(j)\{j}
)∞
s=t
,
where Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
∈ {C, D, D/C}.
3. j’s "debt" to k upto htj : λjk
(
htj
)
. This is the number of C’s j owes to k
upto htj .
4. k’s "debt" to j upto htj : λkj
(
htj
)
. This is the number of C’s k owes to j
upto htj .
5. Let h1j be the null history of j.
Definitions
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1. For any htj , an action profile in period t (a
t
k)k∈N(j) is a surprise to j, if
(atk)k = (Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
)k. To slightly abuse notation, for any a
s
k ∈ {C, D}, if
Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
= D/C, then ask = Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
.
2. For any htj , for any (a
t
k)k, j expects a
t
j to surprise k ∈ N (j) \ {j}, if a
t
j =
Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
. In this case we just say that j surprises k. Again, to slightly
abuse notation, for any asj ∈ {C, D}, if Ej(Ek
(
asj
)
|htj) = D/C, then a
s
j =
Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
. Similarly, for any Ej
(
asj |h
t
j
)
∈ {C, D}, if Ej(Ek
(
asj
)
|htj) =
D/C, then Ej
(
asj |h
t
j
)
= Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
.
3. d
[(
Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
))
s≥t
]
: number of periods in which (j expects that) k
expects j to play D conditional on htj .
4. d
[(
Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
))
s≥t
]
: number of periods in which j expects k to play D
conditional on htj .
5. r (x) =
 0 if x < 0,xT if x ≥ 0 and xT is integer,[ x
T
]
+ 1 if x ≥ 0 and x
T
is not integer,
[
x
T
]
is the largest integer less than x
T
.
2.3 A Road Map
The strategy E is to be defined in a non-standard way. In this subsection we
motivate the way we define E, and sketch a road map that we follow in the
remaining sections.
At the beginning we have some principles and assumptions in mind. The
principles are: 1. Unexpected defection must be punished. 2. Unexpected
cooperation must be punished even harder. 3. A certain amount of tolerance in
expectations (ambiguities in expectations) is needed to cushion the uncertainty
in the environment.
To implement these principles, we define a pair of expectation operators and
a pair of "debt" operators. Both operate on a player’s private histories. Ej (·|·)
is the first order operator, and Ej (Ek (·) |·) is the second order operator, which
is used to define the first order operator: only when j knows how k thinks about
j can j predict future reactions of k to j’s actions. The "debt" operators λjk (·)
and λkj (·) are convenient to keep record of "rights" and "obligations" between
two neighbors. They are also used in the definition of the first order operator.
Here is a schematic illustration:
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λjk (·) λkj (·) Ej (Ek (·) |·)
↘ ↓ ↙
Ej (·|·)
↓
Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
↓
pure strategy E
Now suppose that the above principles are common knowledge among the
players. For player j to be able to form expectations on his neighbors, j has to
make some assumptions on the behavior of those he cannot see. The assumption
j has in mind is that (N (j))c never makes mistakes, i.e., j imagines that the
background is always clean. If this assumption holds, then (1) Ej
(
·|htj
)
is indeed
what happens in N (j) from t on, (2) Ej
(
Ek (·) |h
t
j
)
is indeed what k expects j
from t on, and (3) when j is surprised by k, k knows that; when j thinks that j
surprises k or will surprise k, k is indeed or will indeed be surprised. It turns out
that even if (N (j))c is not clean, we still have (1), (2), and (3) above, as long
as the background is as clean as possible (or, the explanation is a parsimonious
one).
Once we have E, the goal is to find a consistent belief system B, such that
(E,B) is a sequential equilibrium. To this end, we need to show for any htj ,
E is optimal with respect to the expectations formed under B. However, it
is easier to show that E is optimal with respect to the expectations built in
the definition of E. Hence to achieve the goal, it suffices to show that the
expectations formed under B can be mimiced by the built in expectations. In
the next subsection, we define E. In Section 3, we show E is optimal with
respect to the built in expectation operators. We define B in Section 4 and
show that the real expectations formed under B essentially coincide with the
auxiliary expectations in the definition of E.
2.4 The definition
Now we define the strategy E, by defining Ej (·|·) , Ej (Ek (·) |·) , λjk (·) and
λkj (·) inductively. Once the expectation pair is well defined for any h
t
j , j simply
does what Ej (·|·) expects him to do after h
t
j . In the following definition, the d (·)
function and the r (·) function are as defined in Section 2.2 on notations and
definitions. In the following definition, we include some intuitive explanations
in brackets.
Initial configurations
λjk
(
h1j
)
= 0.
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λkj
(
h1j
)
= 0.
Ej
(
Ek(asj)|h
1
j
)
= C, for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j} , s ≥ 1.
Ej
(
ask|h
1
j
)
= C, for any k ∈ N (j) , s ≥ 1.
[ Initially j expects everybody in his neighborhood to play C forever, j also
expects that his neighbors expect him to play C forever.]
Fix t, htj , λjk
(
htj
)
, λkj
(
htj
)
,Ej
(
·|htj
)
, Ej (Ek(·) |h
t
j), and (a
t
k)k . Let h
t+1
j =(
htj , (a
t
k)k
)
.
0 First we define λjk
(
ht+1j
)
and λkj
(
ht+1j
)
.
0.1 If λjk
(
htj
)
= 0, then
λjk
(
ht+1j
)
=

bT if atj = C = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
and not {atk = C = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
},
1 if atj = D = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
and atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
,
0 otherwise.
0.2 If λjk
(
htj
)
> 0, then
λjk
(
ht+1j
)
=

0 if atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
,
λjk
(
htj
)
− 1 if atj = C = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C,
λjk
(
htj
)
otherwise.
0.3 If λkj
(
htj
)
= 0, then
λkj
(
ht+1j
)
=

bT if atk = C = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
and not {atj = C = Ej(Ek(a
t
j)|h
t
j)},
1 if atk = D = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
and atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
,
0 otherwise.
0.4 If λkj
(
htj
)
> 0, then
λkj
(
ht+1j
)
=

0 if atj = Ej
(
Ek(atj)|h
t
j
)
,
λkj
(
htj
)
− 1 if atk = C = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= D/C,
λkj
(
htj
)
otherwise.
1 Second we define Ej (Ek(·) |h
t+1
j ).
Fix k ∈ N (j) \ {j}.
1.1 If atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
,
1.1.1 If atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
, then Ej
(
Ek
(
asj |h
t+1
j
))
= Ej
(
Ek
(
asj |h
t
j
))
, s ≥
t+ 1.
[ If neither j nor k surprises the other, then the updated expectation is just
the continuation of the old one.]
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1.1.2 If atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
,
1.1.2.1 If atk = C, then Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
=
{
D next bT periods,
C thereafter.
1.1.2.2 If atk = D, thenEj
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
=
{
D next T − 1 + λkj
(
ht+1j
)
periods,
C thereafter.
[If k surprises j by playing defection, then k should not only expect j to
punish this defection, but also expect j to collect whatever he owes to j in the
past.]
1.2 If atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
,
1.2.1 If atj = C, then Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= C, s ≥ t+ 1.
1.2.2 If atj = D,
1.2.2.1 If atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
, thenEj
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
=
{
D/C next T − 1 periods,
C thereafter.
1.2.2.2 If atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
,
1.2.2.2.1 If atk = C, then Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
=
{
D next bT periods,
C thereafter.
1.2.2.2.2 If atk = D, thenEj
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
=
{
D next T − 1 periods,
C thereafter.
[ In case of mutual surprise of defection, k should expect j to play defection
for T − 1 periods, then go back to C.]
2 Third we define Ej
(
·|ht+1j
)
.
2.1 If (atk)k =
(
Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
))
k
, then
(
Ej(a
s
k|h
t+1
j )
)
k
=
(
Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
))
k
s ≥
t+ 1.
[If j is not surprised in period t, then the updated expectation is just the
continuation of the old one.]
2.2 If (atk)k =
(
Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
))
k
, let S = {k ∈ N (j) | atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
}.
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2.2.1 If S = {j}, and atj = C, and Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C for any k ∈
N(j)\{j}, then
(
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
))
k
=
(
Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
))
k
s ≥ t+ 1.
2.2.2 Otherwise,
2.2.2.1
If maxk d
[(
Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
))
s≥t+1
]
> 0,
thenEj
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
=
{
D next maxk d
[(
Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
))
s≥t+1
]
periods,
C thereafter.
[j always fully carries out his punishment obligations.]
If maxk d
[(
Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
))
s≥t+1
]
= 0,
thenEj
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
=
{
D as long as Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C for any k,
C otherwise.
2.2.2.2 For k ∈ S, k = j, and atk = C,
2.2.2.2.1 If atj = C = Ej(Ek(a
t
j)|h
t
j), then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=

C next period,
D T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(a
s
j |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
])
periods,
C thereafter.
2.2.2.2.2 Otherwise,
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=

C next bT + 1 periods,
D next T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(asj |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
]
− bT
)
periods,
C thereafter.
[ When j is surprised by k playing C, j expects k to pay him a long string
of C’s, but it might be the case that j will surprise k when the punishment is
over, so j should anticipate that down the road a punishment from k will be
triggered.]
2.2.2.3 For k ∈ S, k = j, and atk = D.
2.2.2.3.1 If atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
, then
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Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=

D/C next T − 1 periods,
C next λkj
(
ht+1j
)
+ 1 periods,
D next T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(a
s
j |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
]
− (T − 1 + λkj
(
ht+1j
)
)
)
periods,
C thereafter.
[j gives k some room (T − 1 periods) to "breathe", just in case k is pun-
ishing other people. Then j continues to collect whatever k owes to him after
the surprise. j also anticipates possible punishments from k if he has to play
defection for such a long time that he surprises k later on.]
2.2.2.3.2 If atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
,
If atj = C, then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=
{
D next T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(asj |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
])
+ bT periods,
C thereafter.
If atj = D, then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=

D next T − 1 periods,
C next 1 period,
D next T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(asj |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
]
− (T − 1)
)
periods,
C thereafter.
2.2.2.4 For k /∈ S, k = j,
2.2.2.4.1
If atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
,
If atj = C, then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=
{
D next T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(a
s
j |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
])
+ bT periods,
C thereafter.
If atj = D, then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=
{
D T + T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(a
s
j |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
]
− (T − 1)
)
+ λjk
(
ht+1j
)
− 1 periods,
C thereafter.
[After j surprises k by playing defection, j should expect k to punish this
defection and possible surprises in the future, as well as to collect whatever debt
(λjk
(
ht+1j
)
periods of C) j owes to k upto ht+1j .]
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2.2.2.4.2
Otherwise, let τ = min{s ≥ t+ 1|Ej
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
= Ej(Ek(a
s
j)|h
t+1
j )}.
2.2.2.4.2.1 If Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C, then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=

Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
upto τ ,
D T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(asj |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
]
− (τ − (t+ 1))
)
periods,
C thereafter.
[ In this case j should anticipate all the possible punishment by k from period
τ on.]
2.2.2.4.2.2 If Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C and Ej
(
at+1j |h
t+1
j
)
= D, then
If λjk
(
ht+1j
)
> 0, then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=

Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
upto τ ,
D T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(a
s
j |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
]
− (τ − (t+ 1))
)
+ λjk
(
ht+1j
)
− 1 periods,
C thereafter.
[ In this case j not only anticipates all the punishment by k from period τ
on, but also expects k to collect whatever he owes to k upto period τ .]
If λjk
(
ht+1j
)
= 0, then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
=

Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
upto τ ,
D T · r
(
d
[(
Ej(a
s
j |h
t+1
j )
)
s≥t+1
]
− (τ − (t+ 1))
)
periods,
C thereafter.
2.2.2.4.2.3 If Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C and Ej
(
at+1j |h
t+1
j
)
= C, then
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
= Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
.
Remark
Complicated as it looks, the definition is trying to capture some simple prin-
ciples in this society: 1. Unexpected defection must be punished, no matter
what causes the defection. 2. Unexpected cooperation must be punished much
more severely so as to keep people from defecting in the first place. 3. Ambigu-
ities in expectations are essential when observations are partial, they lubricates
the society.
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Before moving on to the next section, it is worth pointing out that even
though defined in the same way, the strategy for the end players is dramatically
simpler than the strategy for a middle player. We are able to explicitly write
the end players’ strategy as a finite state automaton, which we present in Figure
1.
PUT FIGURE 1 HERE.
For the ease of exposition, let T = 2, and b = 2. In this automaton, initially
the end player is in state C, where she is supposed to play cooperation. If she
observes (C,C), she stays in the same state. If she observes (C,D), she moves to
state D1 and begins a two period punishment. If she executes the punishment
as planned, and if her neighbor returns to cooperation on time, then she goes
back to state C. If she fails to carry out the punishment, say, in D1, then she
moves to state B̂1, and begins to accept a punishment of four periods. In each
of these four periods, say the first period, if the end player plays D, then she
moves to state I1, in which she plays D for one more period, and if her neighbor
plays D, then she goes back to state B̂1. There is not enough space to write
out fully all the incoming and outgoing arrows. In particular, if any dotted D
in the diagram becomes a C, then the corresponding outgoing arrow should go
to either state B1 or state B̂1, depending on whether it is the end player’s duty
to punish (in which case go to B̂1), or it is her neighbor’s duty to punish (in
which case go to B1).
Notice that the expectation operators essentially defines a finite state au-
tomaton, where a state is a possible expectation generated by the operator;
the initial state is the initial expectation; the action prescribed in a state is
the action prescribed in an expectation; and the transition rules from one state
to another are given by the transition rules from one expectation to another
expectation.
3 E is sequentially rational with respect to the
built-in expectations
In the definition of E, we build players’ expectations on their neighborhood’s
continuation actions into the strategy. Now we are in a position to check se-
quential rationality of E with respect to such expectations. To this end, we ask
the following two questions:
Question 1: For any t, for any htj , if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= C, is it profitable for j to
play D?
Question 2: For any t, for any htj , if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= D, is it profitable for j to
play C?
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Let
ht+1j =
(
htj ; (Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
j
)
)
)
.
Let
ĥt+1j =
(
htj ; (Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
j
)
, Êj
(
atj |h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
j
)
)
)
,
where Êj
(
atj |h
t
j
)
=
{
C if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= D,
D if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= C.
.
In the spirit of the one step deviation property, for any t, for any htj , player
j compares(
(Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
,Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
j
)
);
((
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
)
(i)
with(
(Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
j
)
, Êj
(
atj |h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
j
)
);
((
Ej
(
ask|ĥ
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
)
(ii)
Notice that for some htj , it might be that Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
j
)
= D/C and/or
Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
j
)
= D/C, so that ht+1j and ĥ
t+1
j do not take single values. In this
case, just replace theD/C’s in the conditioning histories in
((
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
and
((
Ej
(
ask|ĥ
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
by D or C, to obtain well defined contin-
uation expectations. By construction of E, it does not matter how we replace
D/C: they all generate the same continuation expectations. Also notice that for
any htj ,
((
Ej
(
ask|ĥ
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
is always single valued, i.e. there is no
D/C in it, unless case 2.2.1 applies, in which case (ii) is trivially inferior to (i).
But
((
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
might contain some ambiguity. When we
compare (i) with (ii), we always replace D/C in
((
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
by D, which is the worst case of (i).
The two questions then ask whether (i) is always preferred to (ii) by j. To
answer these questions, we need the following claims, all of which follow from
the definition of E, and can be proved by induction and definition. We leave
the proofs in the Appendix.
Claim 1 For any htj , for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j}, if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
=
C, then Ej
(
asj |h
t
j
)
= Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
= C, for any s ≥ t, and Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= C.
Claim 2 For any htj , for any s ≥ t, for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j} , ifEj
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
=
D, then Ej
(
asj |h
t
j
)
= D.
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Claim 3 For any htj , for any s ≥ t, for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j} , ifEj
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
=
D/C, then Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
= D.
Claim 4 For any htj , for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j} , if Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C,
then
(a) Ej
(
at
′
k |h
t
j
)
= D.
(b) Ej
(
Ek
(
at
′
j
)
|htj
)
= C, where t′ = min
{
s ≥ t| Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
= D/C
}
.
Claim 5 For any htj , for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j}, if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= C and
λjk
(
htj
)
= 0, then Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C.
Claim 6 For any htj , if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= C, and Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C, for any k ∈
N (j) \ {j} , then there exists k′ ∈ N (j) \ {j} such that Ej
(
Ek′
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= C.
Moreover, for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j}, λjk
(
htj
)
=m (k), where 1 ≤m (k) ≤ bT .
Claim 7 For any htj , if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= D, and if Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D, for
any k ∈ N (j) \ {j}, then Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C, for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j}.
Claim 8 For any htj , if Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= D, and there exists k such that
Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D, then Ej
(
ask′ |h
t
j
)
= C, for any s ≥ t+T − 1, where k′ ∈
argmax
k∈N(j)\{j}
d
[(
Ej(Ek
(
asj
)
|htj)
)
s≥t
]
.
Now we are ready to answer Questions 1 and 2. In the following argument,
(i) represents the future described by Ej
(
·|htj
)
if j does not deviate in period
t, (ii) represents the future described by Ej
(
·|htj
)
if j deviates in period t.
Fix htj , we present the argument in cases.
1 Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= C.
1.1 There exists k such that Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C. In the analysis under 1.1, we
need Claims 1 through 5.
1.1.1 For k′ = k, λjk′
(
htj
)
= m, 1 ≤ m ≤ bT .
1.1.1.1 Ej
(
Ek′
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= C
(i)
k : C (∞)
j : C (∞)
k′ : D (m) +C (∞)
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That is, j expects k and himself to play C forever, j expects k′ to play D
for m periods, then play C forever. The notations that follow are interpreted
similarly.
(ii)
k : C (1) +D (T ) +C (∞)
j : D (T ) +C (∞)
k′ : D (T +m) +C (∞)
Hence if T is large enough, then (i) j (ii).
1.1.1.2 Ej
(
Ek′
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C.
(ii) is better than (i) in period t. (i) is better than (ii) in the next T periods,
because in the next T periods, whenever it’s (C C D) in (i), it’s (D C D)
or (D D D) in (ii), and whenever it’s (C C C) in (i), it’s (D C C) in
(ii). After the next T periods, (i) and (ii) coincide. Hence if T is large enough,
then (i) j (ii).
1.1.2 For k′ = k, λjk′
(
htj
)
= 0.
In this case it must be that Ej
(
Ek′(atj)|h
t
j
)
= C.
(i)
k : C (∞)
j : C (∞)
k′ : C (∞)
(ii)
k : C (1) +D (T ) +C (∞)
j : D (T ) +C (∞)
k′ : C (1) +D (T ) +C (∞)
Hence if T is large enough, then (i) j (ii).
1.2 There does not exist k, such that Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C. In the analysis
under 1.2, we need Claims 2, 3, 4, and 6. We know there exists k′ such that
Ej
(
Ek′(a
t
j)|h
t
j
)
= C, and λjk′
(
htj
)
= m, 1 ≤ m ≤ bT .
1.2.1 Ej
(
Ek(a
t
j)|h
t
j
)
= C˙. Since j does not expect k to play C with him, it
must be that λjk
(
htj
)
= m′, 1 ≤ m′ ≤ bT.
(i)
k : D (m′) +C (∞)
j : C (∞)
k′ : D (m) +C (∞)
(ii)
k : D (T +m′) +C (∞)
j : D (T ) +C (∞)
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k′ : D (T +m) +C (∞)
Hence (i) j (ii).
1.2.2 Ej
(
Ek(a
t
j)|h
t
j
)
= D/C˙. Let n be the number of periods in which k
expects anything from j, let m′ be the number of C′s that j owes k, 1 ≤ n ≤
T − 1, 1 ≤ m′ ≤ bT.
1.2.2.1 m′ + n ≤m
We compare the undiscounted sum of payoffs of (i) and (ii) in the nextm+T
periods, since after the next m + T periods, (i) and (ii) coincide. Denote the
payoffs by pi1 and pi2, respectively.
pi1 = (m
′ + n)(−2l) + (m− (m′ + n))(1− l) + T · 2,
pi2 = n · 0 +m
′ (−2l) + (m+ T − (m′ + n)) (1− l) .
Since l < 1, T > n, we have pi1 > pi2, hence (i) j (ii) if δ is large enough.
1.2.2.2 m′ + n > m
1.2.2.2.1 m′ + n ≥m+ T
Now we compare the undiscounted sum of payoffs of (i) and (ii) in the next
m′+n periods, since after the next m′+n periods, (i) and (ii) coincide. Denote
the payoffs by pi1 and pi2, respectively.
pi1 = m (−2l) + (m
′ + n−m) (1− l) ,
pi2 = n · 0 + (m+ T − n) (−2l) + (m
′ + n− T −m) (1− l) .
Since l < 1, T > n, we have pi1 > pi2, hence (i) j (ii) if δ is large enough.
1.2.2.2.2 m′ + n < m+ T
Now we compare the undiscounted sum of payoffs of (i) and (ii) in the next
m+T periods, since after the next m+T periods, (i) and (ii) coincide. Denote
the payoffs by pi1 and pi2, respectively.
pi1 = m (−2l) + (m
′ + n−m) (1− l) + (m+ T − (m′ + n)) 2,
pi2 = n · 0 +m
′ (−2l) + (m+ T − (m′ + n)) (1− l) .
Since l < 1, T > n, we have pi1 > pi2, hence (i) j (ii) if δ is large enough.
2 Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= D
2.1 If j deviates, no neighbor will be surprised. By Claim 7, It must be that
Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C, for any k ∈ N(j)\{j}. By definition of E (2.2.1), such
deviation is not profitable.
2.2 If j deviates, exactly one neighbor, say k, will be surprised. In the
analysis under 2.2 we need Claim 8.
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2.2.1 For k′ = k, λjk′
(
htj
)
= 0.
(ii)
k : D/C (1) +D (bT ) +C (∞)
j : C (∞)
k′ : C (∞)
If j does not deviate, then in the next bT periods, deviation can be weakly
better than no deviation in at most the first 2T periods. In every other period,
no deviation is better either because C D D j D C C, or because
C C C j D C C. After the next bT periods, it takes at most 2T
periods to make (i) coincide with (ii) . Suppose deviation does better in these
2T periods. We can still choose b large enough so that (i) j (ii).
2.2.2 For k′ = k, λjk′
(
htj
)
= 1.
Let n denote the uncertainty horizon of k′ about j, 0 ≤ n ≤ T − 1.
(ii)
k : D/C (1) +D (bT ) +C (∞)
j : C (∞)
k′ : D(n+ 1) +C (∞)
If j does not deviate, then in the next bT periods, deviation can be weakly
better than no deviation in at most the first 2T periods. In every other period,
no deviation is better either because C D D j D C C, or because
C C C j D C C. After the next bT periods, it takes at most 2T
periods to make (i) coincide with (ii) . Suppose deviation does better in these
2T periods. We can still choose b large enough so that (i) j (ii).
2.2.3 For k′ = k, λjk′
(
htj
)
=m, 2 ≤ m ≤ bT .
Let n denote the uncertainty horizon of k′ about j, 0 ≤ n ≤ T − 1.
(ii)
k : D/C (1) +D (bT ) +C (∞)
j : C (∞)
k′ : D (m+ n) +C (∞)
If j does not deviate, denote the undiscounted sum of j’s payoff in the next
(b+ 2)T +m periods by pi4, denote the counterpart payoff in 2.2.2 by pi2, then
pi2 = pi4 + (m− 1) (1 + l). On the other hand, let pi1 be the corresponding
payoff of (ii) in 2.2.2, and pi3 be the counterpart payoff in 2.2.3, then pi1 =
pi3 + (m− 1) (1 + l). Since pi2 > pi1, it follows that pi4 > pi3.
2.3 j’s deviation will surprise both neighbors.
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(ii)
k : D/C (1) +D (bT ) +C (∞)
j : C (∞)
k′ : D/C (1) +D (bT ) +C (∞)
If j can clear things up within the next bT periods, then (i) j (ii). Other-
wise it takes j at most 2T periods to clear it up. Let (ii) take these 2T periods,
but (i) will take all the bT periods. If b is large enough, no deviation is better.
Basically, the sequential rationality argument relies on T and b. T is used
to deter deviation by defection, and b is used to deter deviation by cooperation.
In all the above analysis, we assume that j has two neighbors. If j is an
end player, it’s staightforward to check that E is optimal for him after any htj
relative to Ej
(
·|htj
)
(notice that the expectation operators are well defined for
end players too. In fact, they are well defined for any player in any graph).
Let us summarize this section by the following lemma:
Lemma 1: In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma on the finite line, for any
0 < l < 1, for any g > 0, there exists 0 < δ < 1, there exists T > 0, b > 0,
such that for any 1 > δ > δ, E is sequentially rational with respect to Ej (·|·).
4 The belief system B
First we classify three types of mistakes that a player could possibly make.
Definition atj is a defection mistake by player j after h
t
j if a
t
j = D =
Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
.
Definition atj is a naive mistake by player j after h
t
j if a
t
j = C = Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
and Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C, for any k ∈ N (j) \ {j}.
Definition atj is a blocking mistake by player j after h
t
j if a
t
j = C =
Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
and Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D, for some k ∈ N (j) \ {j}.
Remark A surprise is not necessarily a mistake, for example, j−1 surprises
j by playing D, but it might be that j−1 is punishing j−2, so it is not a defec-
tion mistake by j−1. A mistake is not necessarily a surprise, for example, naive
mistakes never surprise any neighbor. However, a surprise of unexpected coop-
eration is always a blocking mistake; conversely, a blocking mistake is always a
surprise of unexpected cooperation, because of the following Claim.
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Claim 9 For any global history ht, for any j and k who are neighbors,
Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= Ek
(
atj |h
t
k
)
,
where htj and h
t
k are the restrictions of h
t to N (j) and N (k), respectively.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Let the mistake pattern M be defined in the following way. M assigns
probability bT+1 to blocking mistakes,  to naive mistakes, and 
1
2
+( 1
2
)t to
defection mistakes made in period t. Following the definitions in Section 2.1,
define
H
(
htj
)
=
{
ht| ht explains htj most parsimoniously
}
.
For any ht ∈ H
(
htj
)
, if j uses ht as the explanation, then he knows everything
in the past, and he can fully predict everything in the future. The future
path within N (j) is deterministic, denote it by Ej (·|h
t), and call it the real
expectation that j forms after htj , in the explanation h
t. Formally, fix htj , fix
ht ∈ H
(
htj
)
, Ej (·|ht) is formed by the following steps.
1 Given ht, j calculates the actions each player is going to take in period t,
denote it by (atk)k.
2 Let ht+1 =
(
ht, (atk)k
)
, j then calculates the actions each player is going
to take in period t+ 1, denote it by
(
at+1k
)
k
.
3 Let ht+2 =
(
ht+1,
(
at+1k
)
k
)
, and so on.
The future actions of everybody can be derived following these steps. The
restriction of these actions to N (j) is Ej (·|h
t). Our goal in this section is
to show that the mistake pattern is such that the real expectations formed
after any parsimonious explanation can be essentially duplicated by the artificial
expectations we defined in Section 2.
Lemma 2 Given the mistake pattern M , for any htj , for any h
t ∈
H
(
htj
)
, Ej (·|h
t) = Ej
(
·|htj
)
, the equality is upto the difference between D/C
and D or C.
Proof: Let k be the left neighbor of j, we show that
Ej
(
ask|h
t
)
= Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
, for any s ≥ t.
To this end, we need the following claim, the proof of which is in the Ap-
pendix.
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Claim 10 If for any htj , for any h
t ∈ H
(
htj
)
, Ej (atk|h
t) = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
,
then for any htj , for any h
t ∈ H
(
htj
)
, Ej (ask|h
t) = Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
for any s ≥ t.
By Claim 10, it suffices to show for any htj , for any h
t ∈ H
(
htj
)
, Ej (a
t
k|h
t) =
Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
. If Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= D, then by Claim 9, Ek (Ej (atk) |h
t
k) = D, where h
t
k
is the restriction of ht to N (k). Hence by the definition of E, Ek (atk|h
t
k) = D,
hence Ej (a
t
k|h
t) = D. Need to show that if Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C, then Ek (a
t
k|h
t
k) =
C.
For simplicity we assume that j has only two people to his left, k and k′.
The case of more players can be proved analogously.
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists htj , there exists h
t ∈
H
(
htj
)
, such that Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C, but Ek (atk|h
t
k) = D. Then it must be
that k need to punish the last mistake by k′ in ht. Suppose this last mistake
occurs in period s (see Figure 2), then it must be that in ht k plays D in period
s+ 1, .., t− 1.
PUT FIGURE 2 HERE.
Suppose that the period s mistake is a blocking mistake, then since blocking
is so unlikely to happen according to the mistake pattern M , by the time the
blocking mistake of k′ is realized by j, k should have already finished punishing
it. Since k′ makes no further mistake, there is no punishment obligation of
k coming from k′’s side. Hence it is not possible that Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C, while
Ek (a
t
k|h
t
k) = D.
If the period s mistake is a defection mistake, then there are two cases to
consider.
Case 1 j is not surprised by k’s defection after period s till period t − 1.
Three possibilities. 1. j expects (auxiliary expectation) k to play D from s+ 1
to t− 1. In this case k makes no mistake from s+1 to t− 1, hence the period s
defection mistake by k′ is redundant; 2. j expects k to play D/C from period
s+1 to t−1. Since uncertainty horizon lasts at most for T −1 periods, there are
at most T − 1 periods from s+1 to t− 1. Consider the alternative explanation
in which k′ does not make the mistake in period s, and from s on till t − 1, k′
keeps following her strategy. Call the alternative explanation ĥt. ĥt releases a
period s defection mistake, at a cost of at most one defection mistake by k from
s+ 1 to t− 1. Since the probability of defection mistakes is ascending in time,
ĥt is more efficient at explaining htj than h
t, a contradiction. 3. From s+ 1 to
t− 1, j first expects k to play D/C, then expects k to play D. Combining the
arguments in the first two possiblities, we can also find a better explanation of
htj than h
t, a contradiction.
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Case 2 j is surprised by k’s defection after period s. If j is surprised by
k’s defection after period s, then from s+ 1 to t − 1 there must be more than
T −1 periods, and j must be surprised prior to the last T −1 periods upto t−1
(see Figure 3), since otherwise Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C. During the "surprise" interval
k is supposed to punish k′ even in the absence of the period s mistake, since
otherwise k would not carry out the punishment all the way to period t. Hence
this interval of D’s cannot be mistakes. Therefore we essentially return to Case
1, and if we release the period s mistake by k′, we creat at most one defection
mistake by k during the last T − 1 periods upto t− 1. Hence there is a better
explanation than ht, a contradiction. Let k′ be the right neighbor of j. By
the same argument, Ej (a
s
k′ |h
t) = Ej
(
ask′ |h
t
j
)
, for all s ≥ t. Therefore, by the
definition of Ej
(
·|htj
)
, Ej
(
asj |h
t
)
= Ej
(
asj |h
t
j
)
, for all s ≥ t. This completes the
proof of Lemma 2. 
PUT FIGURE 3 HERE.
Combining Lemma 2 and lemma 1, we are now ready to prove the following
propostion:
Proposition 1 In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma on the finite line, for any
0 < l < 1, for any g > 0, there exists 0 < δ < 1, there exists T > 0, b > 0,
such that for any 1 > δ > δ, (E,B) is a sequential equilibrium that supports
global cooperation.
Proof: Fix htj , fix h
t ∈ H
(
htj
)
.
Let
(i′) =
(
(Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
)
, Ej
(
atj |h
t
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
)
);
((
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
)
,
(ii′) =
(
(Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
)
, Êj
(
atj |h
t
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
)
);
((
Ej
(
ask|ĥ
t+1
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
)
,
where ht+1 is ht augmented by period t in which everybody in the world followed
the strategy, and ĥt+1 is ht augmented by period t in which everybody in the
world except j followed the strategy, and
Êj
(
atj |h
t
)
=
{
C if Ej
(
atj |h
t
)
= D,
D if Ej
(
atj |h
t
)
= C.
To establish the link between (i), (ii) in Lemma 1 and (i′), (ii′), we consider
two cases:
1. Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= C. In this case there is no ambiguity in (i) and (ii). More-
over, ĥt+1 ∈ H
(
ĥt+1j
)
, where ĥt+1j =
(
htj ; (Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
j
)
, Êj
(
atj |h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
j
)
)
)
.
Therefore (i) = (i′), and (ii) = (ii′).
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2. Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= D. In this case there might be some ambiguities in (i) and
(ii), but in (ii), there is no ambiguity in
((
Ej
(
ask|ĥ
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
, even
if ĥt+1j itself may not be single-valued.
Let
ht+1j =
(
htj , (Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
)
, Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
)
)
)
.
Let
ĥ
t+1
j =
(
htj , (Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
)
, Êj
(
atj |h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
)
)
)
.
Let
(i′′) =
(
(Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
)
, Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
)
);
((
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
)
.
Let
(ii′′) =
(
(Ej
(
atj−1|h
t
)
, Êj
(
atj |h
t
j
)
, Ej
(
atj+1|h
t
)
);
((
Ej
(
ask|ĥ
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
)
.
Since ĥt+1 ∈ H
(
ĥ
t+1
j
)
, (ii′′) = (ii′), by Lemma 2. Notice that there might
still be some ambiguities in
((
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
))
k∈N(j)
)∞
s=t+1
, but Lemma 1 implies
that the worst case of (i′′) is preferred by j to (ii′′). Since ht+1 ∈ H
(
ht+1j
)
, (i′)
is one case of (i′′), by Lemma 2. Hence (i′) j (ii
′′) = (ii′), as was to be shown.

Proposition 2 Under the same conditions in Propostion 1, for any ht,
there exists 0 < T (ht) < ∞, such that global cooperation is restored after
T (ht) periods.
Proof: By induction on the number of players. By the definition of the
strategy E, the proposition holds when there are only two players. Suppose the
proposition holds for n players, we need to show that it also holds for n + 1
players.
Suppose there are n+1 players. Fix an arbitrary global history ht. Consider
the left end player, denoted by k. Let j denote k’s neighbor. If after ht, j does
not expect himself to punish k, i.e., Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D, where htj is the
restriction of ht to N (j), then the future path of play of all players to the right
of k is essentially the same as if k does not exist, upto the difference between
D/C and C. Then the proposition holds by the induction hypothesis.
If after ht, j expects himself to punish k for τ periods, then consider the
history ht+τ , which extends ht by τ periods, in which everybody follows the
strategy E. Consider ht+τ , we go back to the previous case, hence the proposi-
tion also holds. 
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5 Conclusion
We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies to support cooperation
on the line when l < 1 and δ is large. We first define a pair of expectation
operators inductively to keep track of "rights" and "obligations" during the play.
Then we show that the pure strategy thus obtained is sequentially rational with
respect to the built-in expectations. The real expectations formed under the
consistent belief system, moreover, can be mimiced by the built-in expectations,
if we perturb the strategy appropriately. Here is a schematic illustration of the
approach.
Expectation −→ Strategy
↑ ↓
Expectation ←− belief
The main message of this paper is this. The ultimate source of stability in
this simple society is shared belief, or mutually compatible expectations on each
other. An explicitly defined expectation system can be used as a social norm.
What is important is not a common observation of a physical outcome, what
is important is a common understanding of the social norm, the understanding
that everybody knows the norm and is willing to follow it after any history.
6 Appendix
Proof of Claim 1: The claim is obviously true if htj = h
1
j , the null history.
Now fix htj , fix an action profile in period t, (a
t
k)k. Suppose the claim holds
for htj , we need to show it also holds for h
t+1
j =
(
htj , (a
t
k)k
)
. That is, we need
to show that if Ej
(
at+1j |h
t+1
j
)
= Ej
(
at+1k |h
t+1
j
)
= C, then (a) Ej
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
=
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
= C, for any s ≥ t+ 1, and (b) Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= C.
Part (b) follows from Claims 2 and 3, we only need to prove part (a).
First, Ej
(
at+1j |h
t+1
j
)
= C =⇒ Ej
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
= C, for any s ≥ t + 1, by the
definition of the first order operator.
Second, we already have Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= C, which, by the definition
of the second order operator, implies that Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= C, for any s ≥
t+ 1, which in turn, together with Ej
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
= C, for any s ≥ t+ 1, implies
that j does not expect himself to surprise k in period t+1,...,∞. By the definition
of E, the only time that j expects k to play C in the current period, but D in
some future period is if j expects himself to surprise k in the future. Therefore,
Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
= C, for any s ≥ t+ 1. 
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Proof of Claim 2: The claim is obviously true if htj = h
1
j , the null history.
Now fix htj , fix an action profile in period t, (a
t
k)k. Suppose the claim holds for
htj , we need to show it also holds for h
t+1
j =
(
htj , (a
t
k)k
)
. That is, we need to
show that if Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D, then Ej
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
= D, for any s ≥ t+ 1.
In period t, if k surprises j, then by 2.2.2.1,
Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D =⇒ Ej
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
= D, for any s ≥ t+ 1.
If k does not surprise j, then by the definition of the second order op-
erator, Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D implies that j does not surprise k either in
period t, which implies that Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
= D, by 1.1.1 (which implies
Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D by the definition of the second order operator). This
in turn, implies that Ej
(
asj |h
t
j
)
= D, by the induction hypothesis, which im-
plies that Ej
(
asj |h
t+1
j
)
= D (since Ej(Ek
(
atj
)
|htj) = D, and j does not surprise
k in period t, j does not block in period t, hence if j expects himself to play D
in period s after htj , j does not change this expectation after h
t+1
j ). 
Proof of Claim 3: The claim is obviously true if htj = h
1
j , the null history.
Now fix htj , fix an action profile in period t, (a
t
k)k. Suppose the claim holds for
htj , we need to show it also holds for h
t+1
j =
(
htj , (a
t
k)k
)
. That is, we need to
show that if Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C, then Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
= D.
Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C =⇒ k does not surprise j in period t.
If j surprises k in period t, then Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
= D by 1.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.4.1.
If j does not surprise k either in period t, then Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
= D/C, by
1.1.1. Let us denote this fact by (1).
(1) =⇒ Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C, by the definition of the second order oper-
ator.
=⇒ Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= D, by the induction hypothesis.
(1) =⇒ Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
= D, by the induction hypothesis.
If Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
is just the continuation of Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
, then we are done. Oth-
erwise, sinceEj
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= D, 2.2.2.4.2.2 applies. In this case, ifEj
(
at+1j |h
t+1
j
)
=
C, then Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C =⇒ Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
= D ; if Ej
(
at+1j |h
t+1
j
)
=
D, then it must be that τ > s, hence Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
= Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
= D. 
Proof of Claim 4: The claim is obviously true if htj = h
1
j , the null history.
Now fix htj , fix an action profile in period t, (a
t
k)k. Suppose the claim holds for
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htj , we need to show it also holds for h
t+1
j =
(
htj , (a
t
k)k
)
. That is, we need to
show that if Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C, then
(a) Ej
(
at
′
k |h
t+1
j
)
= D
(b)Ej
(
Ek
(
at
′
j
)
|ht+1j
)
= C t′ = min
{
s ≥ t+ 1|Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C
}
Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C =⇒ k does not surprise j in period t.
If j surprises k in period t, then (a) and (b) follows from 2.2.2.4.1 and 1.2.2.1.
If j does not surprise k in period t, thenEj
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
by 1.1.1. Hence Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C implies that Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
=
D/C, which by the definition of the second order operator, implies thatEj
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
=
D/C. Let t′′ := min
{
s ≥ t|Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
= D/C
}
, then by the induc-
tion hypothesis, Ej
(
at
′′
k |h
t
j
)
= D and Ej
(
Ek
(
at
′′
j
)
|htj
)
= C. Since t′ =
min
{
s ≥ t|Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C
}
, andEj
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|ht+1j
)
= Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|htj
)
,
we have Ej
(
Ek
(
at
′
j
)
|ht+1j
)
= C.
If Ej
(
ask|h
t+1
j
)
is just the continuation of Ej
(
ask|h
t
j
)
, then we are done be-
cause Ej
(
at
′′
k |h
t
j
)
= D. Otherwise, since Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= D (this is because of
Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C and Claim 3) , 2.2.2.4.2.3 applies. In this case, if
Ej
(
at+1j |h
t+1
j
)
= C, then Ej
(
at
′
k |h
t+1
j
)
= D ; if Ej
(
at+1j |h
t+1
j
)
= D, then it
must be that τ ≥ t′, hence Ej
(
at
′
k |h
t+1
j
)
= Ej
(
at
′
k |h
t
j
)
= D. 
Proof of Claim 5: If Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= D and Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= C, then λjk
(
htj
)
>
0, by the definition of the expectation operators and the debt operators, and an
induction argument; if Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= D/C, then j should expect himself to play
D, either way, we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Claim 6: If for any k′ ∈ N (j) \ {j}, Ej
(
Ek′
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= D/C,
then Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= D, by 2.2.2.1. Hence there exists k′ ∈ N (j) \ {j}, such
that Ej
(
Ek′
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= C. Since Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= C, for any k, it must be that
Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= D, for any k. Hence j must owe each neighbor some debt. 
Proof of Claim 7: If there exists k such that Ej(Ek
(
atj
)
|htj) = C, then
Ej
(
atj |h
t
j
)
= C, by 2.2.2.1. 
Proof of Claim 8: There are two kinds of punishment in the strategy.
Punishment of unexpected defection and punishment of unexpected cooperation.
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The punishee is expected to play C in the second punishment, and D for at
most T − 1 periods in the first punishment, provided that the punishee is not
further surprised by the punisher in the future. But the punishee who expects
the longest punishment from the punisher will not be further surprised by the
punisher in the future, hence the punishee is expected to play C forever after
at most T − 1 periods. 
Proof of Claim 9: Let h1 denote the global null history. By definition,
Ej
(
Ek
(
a1j
)
|h1j
)
= Ek
(
a1j |h
1
k
)
= C
Induction hypothesis: Fix ht, fix each player’s period t action (ati)i. Let
ht+1 =
(
ht, (ati)i
)
. Suppose the claim is true for any subhistory hs of ht, includ-
ing ht itself. We need to show that the claim also holds for ht+1.
First consider the case where
atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
and atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
In this case, Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
, by 1.1.1 in the defi-
nition of the strategy.
If Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
= D/C, then it must be that after some subhistory hs
of ht, D = asj = Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|hsj
)
. Let hs be the longest such subhistory. By
the induction hypothesis, asj = Ek
(
asj |h
s
k
)
. From period s+1 to period t− 1, it
must be that neither j nor k further surprises the other, otherwise either hs is
not the longest history, or Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
= D/C.
Since D = asj = Ej
(
Ek
(
asj
)
|hsj
)
= Ek
(
asj |h
s
k
)
, and Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
=
D/C, it must be that Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|hs+1j
)
= D/C, by repeated application
of 1.1.1. Hence Ek
(
at+1j |h
s+1
k
)
= D/C, since the first order operator and the
second order operator are always matched to each other. Then since no surprise
occurs between j and k in period s+ 1,..,t, we have Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
= D/C, as
was to be shown.
If Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
= D, then it must be that after some subhistory hs,
ask = Ej
(
ask|h
s
j
)
= Ek (Ej (a
s
k) |h
s
k), where the equality is by the induction
hypothesis. Again, let hs be the longest such subhistory. From period s+ 1 to
t− 1, it must be that neither j nor k further surprises the other.
Since ask = Ej
(
ask|h
s
j
)
= Ek (Ej (a
s
k) |h
s
k), and Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
= D, it
must be that Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|hs+1j
)
= D, by repeated application of 1.1.1. Since
the first order operator always matches with the second order operator, it must
be that Ek
(
at+1j |h
s+1
k
)
= D. Since no surprises occur between j and k in period
s+ 1,.., t, Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
= D, as was to be shown.
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If Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
= C, then need to show Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
= C. Suppose
otherwise that Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
= D. Then there must exist a longest subhistory
hs of ht, such that ask = Ek (Ej (a
s
k) |h
s
k) = Ej
(
ask|h
s
j
)
, where the equality is by
the induction hypothesis. From period s+ 1 to period t− 1, it must be that j
does not further surprise k, and k does not further surprise j, either.
Since ask = Ej
(
ask|h
s
j
)
, and the first order operator always matches the
second order operator, it must be that Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|hs+1j
)
= D, which implies
Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
= D, by repeated application of 1.1.1. But we begins with
Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
= C, a contradiction.
Similarly, when Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|htj
)
= C, it cannot be that Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
=
D/C.
Second consider the case where atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
. Notice by the induc-
tion hypothesis, Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
= Ek
(
atj |h
t
k
)
.
1. atj = C. In this case Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= C = Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
.
2. atj = D.
2.1 If atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
, then atk = Ek (Ej (a
t
k) |h
t
k), by the induction hypoth-
esis. In this case Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= D/C = Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
.
2.2 If atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
= Ek (Ej (a
t
k) |h
t
k), then Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= D =
Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
.
Third consider the case where atj = Ej
(
Ek
(
atj
)
|htj
)
, but atk = Ej
(
atk|h
t
j
)
.
In this case Ej
(
Ek
(
at+1j
)
|ht+1j
)
= D = Ek
(
at+1j |h
t+1
k
)
. 
Proof of Claim 10: The claim is trivially true when s = t. Now we show
that the claim is true for s = t+ 1.
Let ati = Ej (a
t
i|h
t), for any player i. Let ht+1 =
(
ht, (ati)i
)
, and ht+1j =(
htj , (a
t
k)k∈N(j)
)
. Then it must be that ht+1 ∈ H
(
ht+1j
)
, since otherwise ht /∈
H
(
htj
)
. Then we have
Ej
(
at+1k |h
t
)
= Ej
(
at+1k |h
t+1
)
= Ej
(
at+1k |h
t+1
j
)
= Ej
(
at+1k |h
t
j
)
,
where the first equality is by the definition of real expectations, the second
equality is by the condition in the claim, and the third equality is because j is
not surprised by (atk)k∈N(j), hence the new expectation is just the continuation
of the old.
The proof is analogous for s > t+ 1. 
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